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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situa-
tions when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based
on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical
analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation
value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in
real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrep-
ancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which
cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other
factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be
unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation
model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed
of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players.
Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the
binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring
under some mild conditions.
1 Introduction
Humans and other animals often cooperate even when cooperation is more costly than defec-
tion. In such social dilemma situations, direct reciprocity is among main reasons for cooperation
between pairs of individuals that repeatedly meet each other (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984).
However, individuals, in particular humans, cooperate with others even when they seldom meet
the same partners more than once, as is the case for large populations. Reputation-based in-
direct reciprocity (also called downstream reciprocity; we simply call it indirect reciprocity in
this paper) seems to be a dominant mechanism that enables cooperation in this situation. In
indirect reciprocity, individuals cooperate with others with good reputations and they in turn
gain good reputations if they appositely behave (e.g., cooperate) toward somebody else. The
conditions under which indirect reciprocity realizes cooperation have been theoretically and
numerically clarified in great details (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b;
Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003; Fishman, 2003;
Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005;
Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006; Pacheco et al., 2006;
Roberts, 2008; Uchida, 2010; Nakamura & Masuda, 2011; Berger, 2011; Sigmnud, 2012).
Under the so-called image scoring, cooperation and defection are regarded to be good and
bad behavior, respectively (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b). Laboratory
experiments suggest that humans use image scoring to evaluate others’ behavior (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000;
Milinski et al., 2001; Seinen & Schram, 2006). However, main theories attain that image scor-
ing does not stabilize cooperation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003;
Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; Roberts, 2008). Although some
studies have shown the viability of cooperation under image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a;
Fishman, 2003; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006;
Uchida, 2010), the situations in which cooperation occurs are, in our view, quite restricted (but
see (Berger, 2011); we discuss this reference in Discussion). Under image scoring, cooperation
occurs only when individuals always cooperate in the first round (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a),
unconditional defectors sometimes cooperate (Fishman, 2003), the number of interaction obeys
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the binomial distribution (Brandt & Sigmund, 2004) or Poisson distribution (Brandt & Sigmund, 2006),
the probability that individuals recognize others’ reputations increases in time (Brandt & Sigmund, 2005),
or the reputations of individuals are revealed to others with a small probability (Uchida, 2010).
Therefore, the reason for the discrepancy between the experiments and theory remains obscure.
For mathematical tractability and possible influences of the first seminal theoretical pa-
pers on this subject (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b), most theoretical
results of indirect reciprocity are derived from the analysis of binary reputation models. In
other words, individuals are endowed with the binary reputation, i.e., good (+) or bad (−), de-
pending on the last action toward others and other factors. However, the binary reputation may
not be realistic in that only the last behavior of an individual in the social dilemma situation
determines the reputation of the individual. In fact, experimental (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000;
Milinski et al., 2001; Seinen & Schram, 2006; Milinski et al., 2002; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002;
Keser, 2003; Bolton & Katok, 2004; Bolton et al., 2005; Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009) and
numerical (Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2005) studies of indirect reciprocity in the context of on-
line marketplaces often assume that the reputations are many valued, which complies with the
reality of online marketplaces (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick et al., 2006). More than
binary valued reputations have also been employed in numerical studies of indirect reciprocity in
theoretical biology literature (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b; Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Mohtashemi & Mui, 2003;
Roberts, 2008). Nevertheless, these studies are not concerned with relationships between the
degree of cooperation and the number of the possible reputation values.
In this paper we analyze a trinary reputation model to identify stable populations that
realize cooperation. The difference between the present results and those derived from the
binary reputation models is remarkable. In particular, we find that image scoring can stabilize
cooperation in the trinary reputation model.
2
2 Model
2.1 Donation Game with Reputations
We consider an infinitely large population. In each generation, the so-called donation game is
repeated for sufficiently many rounds. Figure 1(A) illustrates the interaction in each round.
Two players are randomly selected from the population, one as donor and the other as re-
cipient, with the equal probability. The donor intends to cooperate (C) or defect (D) toward
the recipient according to the action rule σ, which we define below. We assume that the
donor misimplements intended C such that the donor actually defects with probability ǫi > 0
and that the intended D is always correctly implemented. We seek the possibility of coop-
eration in the population under this kind of implementation error, which is adverse to coop-
eration (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Fishman, 2003; Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004;
Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004;
Brandt & Sigmund, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006; Uchida, 2010; Berger, 2011). If the donor
implements C, the donor pays cost c, and the recipient obtains benefit b. If the donor imple-
ments D, the payoffs to the donor and recipient do not change. We assume that 0 < c < b such
that the donation game is essentially the prisoner’s dilemma.
We assume that each player possesses a reputation that takes one of the three values, i.e.,
G (Good), N (Neutral), or B (Bad). The action rule σ is a function from the recipient’s
reputation to the donor’s intended action (i.e., C or D). Therefore, there are 23 = 8 action
rules, as shown in Fig. 1(B). For example, the AllC and AllD intend C and D regardless of
the recipient’s reputation, respectively. The so-called generous discriminator (gDisc) intends
C when the recipient’s reputation is either G or N and D otherwise. The so-called rigorous
discriminator (rDisc) intends C when the recipient’s reputation is G and D otherwise.
At the end of each round, the observer assesses the donor to be + or − depending on
the donor’s implemented action (i.e., C or D) and the recipient’s reputation (i.e., G, N, or
B). Such an assessment rule is a function from the donor’s implemented action and the re-
cipient’s reputation to the observer’s assessment and is called the second-order social norm,
which extends the concept in the case of the binary reputation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001;
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Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). There are 22×3 = 64 social norms. For example, under the social
norm called image scoring (Fig. 1(C)), the observer assigns + and − to the donor’s actions
C and D, respectively, regardless of the recipient’s reputation. Another social norm named
scoring–standing is also shown in Fig. 1(C). Finally, we assume that the assessment (i.e., +
or −) that the donor receives is opposite to the one assigned by the observer with probabil-
ity ǫa > 0 (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). We
assume that the donor’s reputation is publicly shared in the population. In other words, the
donor’s new reputation is instantaneously known to all the players in the population.
We repeat many rounds of the game and define the payoff to each player as the sum of the
payoff obtained in the games that involve the player. Because the population is infinite, each
pair of players plays the game at most once such that direct reciprocity is excluded.
For a later use, we mention four representative second-order social norms in the binary rep-
utation model (Fig. 1(D)). Image scoring (“scoring” in Fig. 1(D)) does not stabilize cooperation
(Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007;
Roberts, 2008) unless somewhat strong conditions are met (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a; Fishman, 2003;
Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2005; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006; Uchida, 2010)
(but see (Berger, 2011)). Simple standing (“standing” in Fig. 1(D)) and stern judging (“judg-
ing” in Fig. 1(D); also called Kandori (Kandori, 1992)) are known to stabilize cooperation
(Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004). Shunning stabilizes cooperation under certain conditions (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007;
Nakamura & Masuda, 2011).
2.2 Reputation Dynamics
After each round, the donor’s reputation is updated on the basis of the observer’s assessment.
Basically, the donor’s reputation shifts upward and downward if the donor receives + and
−, respectively. When the reputation is binary (i.e., G and B), G and B are equivalent to
+ and − that the donor receives in the last game, respectively (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a;
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). However, the relationship between the reputation and assessment
is not straightforward in the trinary reputation model. We assume that reputation dynamics
obey a Markov chain. We consider the reputation dynamics illustrated in Fig. 2.
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In the reputation dynamics shown in Fig. 2(A), which we call the gradual dynamics, the
reputation is assumed to move by at most one level in each round. The reputation is unchanged
with probability α (0 ≤ α < 1).
In the reputation dynamics shown in Fig. 2(B), which we call the saltatory dynamics, the
donor’s reputation can transit from G to B or vice versa in one step. When a G donor receives
−, the donor’s new reputation becomes B and N with probabilities βd and 1− βd, respectively
(0 ≤ βd ≤ 1). When a B donor receives +, the donor’s new reputation becomes G and N with
probabilities βu and 1 − βu, respectively (0 ≤ βu ≤ 1). When (βd, βu) = (1, 0), the reputation
dynamics are similar to the so-called T -period punishment with T = 2 (Kandori, 1992) in
which players have either state 0 (innocent), 1 (guilty and no repent), ..., or T (guilty and
T − 1 times of repentant behavior). Guilty players in state 1 regain the innocent state by
cooperating with innocent players successive T times. Therefore, the states 0, 1, and 2 are
similar to reputations G, B, and N, respectively, in our model. When (βd, βu) = (0, 1), the
reputation dynamics are similar to the so-called tolerant scoring (Berger, 2011) because the
donor’s reputation becomes B if and only if the donor receives − in the last two rounds, and
the donor obtains a G reputation if the donor cooperates just once.
3 Analysis Methods
3.1 Homogeneous Populations
We first examine the stability of a homogeneous population of resident players with action
rule σ against mutants with different action rules under a given social norm. Let pG, pN, and
pB be the probabilities that the reputation of a resident player is G, N, and B, respectively.
After a transient of the reputation dynamics, the three probabilities converge to the equilibrium
values denoted by p∗G, p
∗
N, and p
∗
B. For expository purposes, we focus on the gradual reputation
dynamics (Fig. 2(A)) in this section. The following calculations are similar for the saltatory
reputation dynamics (Fig. 2(B)); the corresponding results are shown in Appendix A. For the
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gradual reputation dynamics, we obtain


p∗G = p
∗
G[α + (1− α)Φ
∗] + p∗N(1− α)Φ
∗,
p∗N = p
∗
G(1− α)(1− Φ
∗) + p∗Nα + p
∗
B(1− α)Φ
∗,
p∗B = p
∗
N(1− α)(1− Φ
∗) + p∗B[α + (1− α)(1− Φ
∗)],
(1)
where Φ∗ is the probability that the donor receives + in the equilibrium. Equation (1) and the
normalization p∗G + p
∗
N + p
∗
B = 1 lead to
(p∗G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B) =
(
Φ∗2
1− Φ∗ + Φ∗2
,
Φ∗(1− Φ∗)
1− Φ∗ + Φ∗2
,
(1− Φ∗)2
1− Φ∗ + Φ∗2
)
. (2)
It should be noted that Eq. (2) and the following results are independent of the value of α.
Equation (2) implies that the distribution of the reputation is monotonous in the sense that
p∗G > p
∗
N > p
∗
B if Φ
∗ > 0.5 and p∗G < p
∗
N < p
∗
B if Φ
∗ < 0.5.
Φ∗ is given by
Φ∗ =
∑
r∈{G,N,B}
p∗r [ζrΦC,r + (1− ζr)ΦD,r], (3)
where ζr represents the probability that the donor’s implemented action is C when the recipient
has reputation r ∈ {G,N,B}. ζr has a one-to-one correspondence with action rule σ. For
example, AllC, gDisc, rDisc, and AllD are equivalent to (ζG, ζN, ζB) = (1 − ǫi, 1 − ǫi, 1 − ǫi),
(1 − ǫi, 1 − ǫi, 0), (1 − ǫi, 0, 0), and (0, 0, 0), respectively. ΦC,r and ΦD,r in Eq. (3) are the
probabilities that the donor receives + when the donor’s action is C and D, respectively, and
the recipient has reputation r ∈ {G,N,B}. For example, under image scoring (Fig. 1(C)),
ΦC,r = 1 − ǫa and ΦD,r = ǫa for any r. Under the so-called scoring–standing (see Sec. 4.1 for
the notation of the social norms) shown in Fig. 1(C), ΦC,r = 1− ǫa for any r, ΦD,+ = ΦD,0 = ǫa,
and ΦD,− = 1 − ǫa. Each term on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is a multiplication of three
probabilities, i.e., (i) probability p∗r that a recipient with reputation r is selected, (ii) probability
ζr or 1 − ζr that a donor implements C or D, respectively, and (iii) probability ΦC,r or ΦD,r
that the observer assigns + to the donor.
We substitute p∗G, p
∗
N, and p
∗
B obtained from Eq. (2) in the right-hand side of Eq. (3), which
we denote by f(Φ∗). We obtain Φ∗ by solving x = f(x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Because f(x) has a
quadratic numerator and denominator in terms of x, equation x = f(x) has at most three
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solutions. Under any pair of action rule and social norm, to which we refer as action–norm pair
in the following, 0 < ǫa ≤ f(x) ≤ (1− ǫi)(1− ǫa) < 1 holds true for any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Therefore,
the iteration scheme, in which we start with an initial x value (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) and repeatedly apply
f , always converges. If the iteration starting from x = 0 and that starting from x = 1 converge
to the same value, the solution specified by Φ∗ and {p∗G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B} is unique. We confirmed that
x = f(x) has a unique solution for each of the 8× 64 = 512 action–norm pairs.
Let Ψ(σ, {pG, pN, pB}) be the probability that a donor with action rule σ cooperates with a
recipient randomly chosen from a population according to reputation distribution {pG, pN, pB}.
We obtain
Ψ(σ, {pG, pN, pB}) = pGζG + pNζN + pBζB. (4)
The average payoff per round to a resident player in the homogeneous population is given by
π = −cΨ(σ, {p∗G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B}) + bΨ(σ, {p
∗
G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B}). (5)
To examine the stability of the homogeneous population, we consider an infinitesimally small
fraction of mutants with action rule σ′( 6= σ) that invades the homogeneous resident population.
The equilibrium probability distribution of the mutant’s reputation, denoted by {p′∗G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B},
the equilibrium probability that a mutant receives +, denoted by Φ′∗, and payoff to a mutant
player, denoted by π′, are given by
(p′∗G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B) =
(
Φ′∗2
1− Φ′∗ + Φ′∗2
,
Φ′∗(1− Φ′∗)
1− Φ′∗ + Φ′∗2
,
(1− Φ′∗)2
1− Φ′∗ + Φ′∗2
)
, (6)
Φ′∗ =
∑
r∈{G,N,B}
p∗r[ζ
′
rΦC,r + (1− ζ
′
r)ΦD,r], (7)
and
π′ = −cΨ(σ′, {p∗G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B}) + bΨ(σ, {p
′∗
G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B}), (8)
respectively. In Eq. (7), ζ ′r represents the probability that a mutant cooperates with a recipient
with reputation r. It should be noted that p∗r in Eq. (7) is the solution of Eqs. (2) and (3) and
that ΦC,r and ΦD,r also refer to the values for the resident population.
Action rule σ adopted by the resident players is strict Nash equilibrium if the payoff to a
resident player (i.e., π) is larger than the payoff to any mutant player (i.e., π′). Using Eqs. (5)
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and (8), we obtain this condition as follows:
b
c
[Ψ(σ, {p′∗G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B})−Ψ(σ, {p
∗
G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B})]
<Ψ(σ′, {p∗G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B})−Ψ(σ, {p
∗
G, p
∗
N, p
∗
B}) for any σ
′ 6= σ.
(9)
We also investigate the stability of action rule σ against invasion by a previously iden-
tified strong competitor (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001), which is so-called the Self strategy
(Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004). A Self donor plays a donation game as selfishly as possible under the
constraint that the donor’s reputation stays above a threshold. When determining the action,
the Self donor refers to its own reputation and does not refer to the recipient’s reputation. We
assume that the Self donor defects if its reputation is G and cooperates otherwise. Under the
gradual reputation dynamics, the Self player maintains its reputation value at G or N, not B,
except in the case of error.
3.2 Heterogeneous Populations Composed of Two Action Rules
We also examine the stability of heterogeneous populations in which two action rules, denoted
by σ1 and σ2, coexist with fractions q1 and q2, respectively (q1 + q2 = 1). For each of (q1, q2) =
(0.01, 0.99), (0.02, 0.98), ..., (0.99, 0.01)), we first calculate the equilibrium probabilities of +
for σ1 and σ2 by an iteration scheme similar to that described in Sec. 3.1. Under the gradual
reputation dynamics, the distribution of the reputation values is given by
(p∗G,i, p
∗
N,i, p
∗
B,i) =
(
Φ∗i
2
1− Φ∗i + Φ
∗
i
2
,
Φ∗i (1− Φ
∗
i )
1− Φ∗i + Φ
∗
i
2
,
(1− Φ∗i )
2
1− Φ∗i + Φ
∗
i
2
)
, (10)
where p∗r,i is the equilibrium probability that a player with action rule i (i = 1, 2) possesses
reputation r ∈ {G,N,B}, and Φ∗i represents the equilibrium probability that a σi player receives
+. The equivalent of Eq. (10) and the following results can be obtained similarly for the
saltatory reputation dynamics. Φ∗i is given by
Φ∗i =
2∑
j=1
∑
r∈{G,N,B}
qjp
∗
r,j[ζr,iΦC,r + (1− ζr,i)ΦD,r], (11)
where ζr,i is the probability that a σi donor implements C when the recipient has reputation r.
Substitution of Eq. (10) into Eq. (11) leads to
−→
Φ∗ = g(
−→
Φ∗), where
−→
Φ∗ = (Φ∗1,Φ
∗
2).
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It should be noted that
−→
Φ∗ = g(
−→
Φ∗) may have multiple fixed points. An example is given by
the population composed of the equal fraction of σ1 = gDisc and σ2 = rDisc, i.e., q1 = q2 = 0.5,
under image scoring. In this case, both a cooperative population (i.e., Φ∗1,Φ
∗
2 ≈ (1− ǫi)(1− ǫa))
and a defective population (i.e., Φ∗1,Φ
∗
2 ≈ ǫa) satisfy
−→
Φ∗ = g(
−→
Φ∗). Because of the multistability,
we adopt 112 = 121 initial conditions, i.e.,
−→
Φ = (0.1i, 0.1j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 10, for the iteration
scheme to identify all the fixed points. In fact, we find that the multistability does not cause a
severe problem. We will show in Results that five mixed populations composed of two action
rules are stable and realize a sufficiently large probability of cooperation. Among them, only
one population, which consists of gDisc and rDisc and is stable under the so-called scoring-
shunning social norm, yields the bistable equilibria. One equilibrium yields a large cooperation
probability (> 0.93) and the other equilibrium yields a low cooperation probability (< 0.03).
These results are qualitatively the same for the gradual and saltatory reputation dynamics. For
this social norm, we only keep the more cooperative equilibrium.
Then, we obtain the trinary distribution of reputation for each of the two action rules by
substituting Φ∗i in Eq. (11). The average payoff per round to a σi resident player (i = 1, 2) is
given by
πi = −c
2∑
j=1
qjΨ(σi, {p
∗
G,j, p
∗
N,j, p
∗
B,j}) + b
2∑
j=1
qjΨ(σj, {p
∗
G,i, p
∗
N,i, p
∗
B,i}), (12)
where Ψ(σi, {p
∗
G,j, p
∗
N,j, p
∗
B,j}) is the probability that a σi donor cooperates with a σj recipient.
In the equilibrium, the payoffs to the players with the different action rules are the same.
Therefore, we calculate the value of b/c for which π1 = π2. If d(π1 − π2)/dq1 > 0, the mixed
population is unstable against an infinitesimally small drift of the fraction of the two action
rules. We are concerned with the pairs of σ1 and σ2 that satisfy d(π1 − π2)/dq1 < 0 at the
obtained b/c value.
The mixed population is strict Nash when the payoff to any of the six mutants with a third
action rule is smaller than that to a resident player. By substituting Eq. (6) in
Φ′∗ =
2∑
j=1
∑
r∈{G,N,B}
qjp
∗
r,j[ζ
′
rΦC,r + (1− ζ
′
r)ΦD,r], (13)
we obtain the equilibrium probability that a mutant receives + (i.e., Φ′∗) and the equilibrium
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distribution of the mutant’s reputation (i.e., {p′∗G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B}). The payoff to a mutant player is
given by
π′ = −c
2∑
j=1
qjΨ(σ
′, {p∗G,j, p
∗
N,j, p
∗
B,j}) + b
2∑
j=1
qjΨ(σj, {p
′∗
G, p
′∗
N, p
′∗
B}). (14)
As in the analysis of the homogeneous population, we also examine the stability of the hetero-
geneous population against invasion by the Self mutant (Sec. 3.1).
We do not examine the mixed population composed of more than two action rules.
4 Results
We refer to each action rule by concatenating three letters, either C or D. The first, second,
and the third letters represent the intended action toward a recipient with reputation G, N,
and B, respectively. For example, gDisc = CCD and rDisc = CDD.
4.1 Gradual Reputation Dynamics
4.1.1 Enumeration of Stable Populations
We set ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 and consider the gradual reputation dynamics (Fig. 2(A)). We found
that the homogeneous population is stable against invasion by mutants for some benefit-to-
cost values b/c for 108 out of 8 × 64 = 512 action–norm pairs. We exclude 64 pairs with
σ = AllD from the 108 pairs because of the lack of cooperation. The entire game is symmetric
with respect to the simultaneous flipping of G ↔ B and + ↔ − (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004).
Therefore, there are (108 − 64)/2 = 22 essentially distinct pairs. The 22 pairs are listed in
Table 1. In addition, there are nine essentially distinct mixtures of two action rules that are
stable under a certain social norm. Among these stable populations, there are 12 homogeneous
populations composed of a single action rule and five heterogeneous populations composed of
two action rules that realize a probability of cooperation larger than 0.5 for a b/c value smaller
than 20. Our additional numerical simulations suggest that the probability of cooperation tends
to unity if and only if this criterion is satisfied (Appendix B).
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The cooperative equilibria, i.e., stable populations satisfying this criterion under a given
social norm, are summarized in Fig. 3(A). In Fig. 3(A), a social norm is represented by a
combination of sG, sN, and sB, each of which takes either ++, −+, −−, or +−. For example,
sG = −+ indicates that donor’s implemented action C and D toward a G recipient is assessed
to be − and +, respectively. In fact, all the cooperative equilibria require sG = +− such that
only sN and sB are indicated in Fig. 3(A).
4.1.2 sN = ++ or −+
Six action–norm pairs having σ = rDisc, sG = +−, sN = ++ or −+, and sB = ++, −+, or −−
realize a large probability of cooperation (≈ 0.94), a large probability of + (≈ 0.98), and a mild
restriction on b/c (i.e., b/c > 1.004). In these equilibria, most resident players have the G
reputation because the probability of + is large. A small fraction of players possesses the N
reputation owing to error (see Sec. 2.1 for the definition of two types of error), and an even
smaller fraction of players possesses the B reputation. We verified that the population is stable
against invasion by Self players (Sec. 3.1) under each of the six social norms.
We call the six social norms standing–standing, standing–judging, standing–shunning, judging–
standing, judging–judging, and judging–shunning. The first (second) half of the name repre-
sents the social norm represented by sG and sN (sG and sB) in the case of the binary reputation
model. For example, the combination of sG = +− and sN = ++ represents the standing
social norm in the binary model if N is identified with B in the binary model (Fig. 1(D)).
Similarly, the combination of sG = +− and sB = −+ represents the judging social norm in the
binary model. Therefore, we call the social norm given by sG = +−, sN = ++, and sB = −+
standing–judging.
The six norms realize nearly perfect cooperation because the first half of the social norm
(i.e., combination of sG and sN) is either standing or judging and the rDisc donor cooperates
with G recipients, but not N recipients. It should be noted that standing and judging are
the only second-order social norms that stabilize cooperation without special conditions in the
binary reputation model (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004). Even if the donor’s reputation transits from
N to B owing to error, the donor regains the N reputation by cooperating with a G recipient,
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which occupies the majority of the population. Although donors meeting recipients with the B
reputation receive − under sB = −−, cooperation at the population level is maintained because
few players have the B reputation.
4.1.3 sN = −−
Two cooperative action–norm pairs, i.e., σ = rDisc, sG = +−, sN = −−, and sB = ++ or −+,
are also stable under a mild condition on b/c, i.e., b/c > 1.018. The homogeneous population
of rDisc is not invaded by Self strategy under each of the two social norms. However, the
probability of + (≈ 0.74) and that of cooperation (≈ 0.66) are not as large as those for the
previous six action–norm pairs. This is intuitively because, under the current social norms,
i.e., shunning–standing and shunning–judging, a donor whose recipient has an N reputation
always receives − except in the case of the assessment error. This behavior of the model is
similar to that under shunning in the binary reputation model. Nevertheless, different from
the case of the binary model, the cooperation probability tends to unity in the error-free limit
(Appendix B) for the two norms in the trinary reputation model. We discuss this point further
in Discussion.
4.1.4 sN = +−
The other cooperative equilibria are four homogeneous populations and five heterogeneous
populations, which are stable under social norms satisfying sG = sN = +− (Fig. 3(A)). For
sB = ++ (scoring–standing) and −+ (scoring–judging), a homogeneous population composed
of gDisc is stable for large b/c (> 8.480), and a mixed population composed of gDisc and rDisc
is stable for small b/c (< 8.480). For sB = −− (scoring–shunning), a homogeneous population
composed of gDisc is stable for large b/c (> 8.108), and a mixed population composed of gDisc
and rDisc is stable for small b/c (< 8.108). The fraction of gDisc increases with b/c under
scoring–standing and is unity when b/c > 8.480, as shown in Fig. 3(B). The results shown in
Fig. 3(B) are indistinguishable from those for scoring–judging and similar to those for scoring–
shunning. For the three social norms, the fraction of gDisc converges to 1 − c/b in the limit
ǫi, ǫa → 0 (Appendix C), which implies that only the mixed population of gDisc and rDisc
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is stable in the error-free limit. Consistent with this, the threshold value of b/c above which
the homogeneous gDisc population is stable diverges as the error probabilities become small
(Appendix B).
If we hypothetically merge G and N, our result that cooperation is stable under scoring–
standing and scoring–judging corresponds to the fact that the cooperation is stable under stand-
ing and judging, respectively, in the binary model (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004). Under scoring–
shunning, cooperation is not undermined by sB = −− for the same reason as that for standing–
shunning and judging–shunning (see Sec. 4.1.2 and Discussion).
Under scoring–scoring (i.e., sG = sN = sB = +−), which we also call the image scoring
(Fig. 1(C)), there are three types of stable populations depending on the b/c value. When
1.941 < b/c < 8.230, the mixed population composed of gDisc and CDC is stable (Fig. 3(C)).
We regard CDC as a variant of rDisc because there are few players having the B reputation in
the stable population; a CDC player obtains a slightly larger payoff than an rDisc player. In
fact, the mixed population of gDisc and rDisc is stable against invasion by all but CDC mu-
tants. When 8.230 < b/c < 12.53, the homogeneous population of gDisc is stable (Fig. 3(C)).
When b/c > 12.53, the mixed population composed of gDisc and AllC is stable (Fig. 3(C)).
In all the three cases, cooperation occurs with a large probability (> 0.94). This result is in a
stark contrast with that in the binary reputation model, whereby image scoring does not usu-
ally support cooperation (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003; Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004;
Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007; Roberts, 2008). We discuss this discrepancy in Discussion.
Under image scoring, the values of b/c and the error probabilities under the assumption
ǫi = ǫa, for which one of the three populations is stable are shown in Fig. 4(A). For small
error, the homogeneous population of gDisc and the mixed population composed of gDisc and
AllC are invaded by rDisc mutants. Only the heterogeneous population composed of gDisc and
CDC survives the error-free limit. In this limit, the fraction of gDisc is given by 1 − c/b for
the same reason as that for the heterogeneous population composed of gDisc and rDisc under
scoring–standing (Sec. 4.1.4; also see Appendix C).
The nine populations stable under sG = sN = +− are unstable against invasion by Self mu-
tants. When there are more than two possible reputation values, Self is generally a strong com-
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petitor under image scoring such that it undermines cooperation (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001).
Our results are consistent with theirs. In the next section, we propose a different reputation
dynamics that makes cooperation stable against invasion by Self under image scoring.
4.2 Saltatory Reputation Dynamics
4.2.1 Downward Saltation
We first investigate a saltatory reputation dynamics (Fig. 2(B)) given by βd = 0.5 and βu = 0.
This dynamics implies that a G reputation of a donor jumps down to a B reputation in one
step with a probability βd = 0.5. We set ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 and identify stable populations under
each social norm. To select cooperative equilibria, we imposed the same condition as that in
the case of the gradual reputation dynamics, i.e., a cooperation probability larger than 0.5 for
some b/c < 20.
We find that the set of cooperative equilibria (without consideration of Self mutants) is the
same as that for the gradual reputation dynamics (Fig. 3(A)). The cooperation probability is
equal to 0.9237 for rDisc under standing–standing, 0.8614 for rDisc under standing–shunning,
0.6804 for rDisc under shunning–standing, 0.9340 for gDisc under scoring–standing, and 0.9340
for gDisc under scoring–shunning or image scoring. The cooperation probability is preserved if
we replace standing by judging. Because a G reputation can turn into a B reputation in one step,
the probability of cooperation is somewhat smaller than in the case of the gradual reputation
dynamics. The difference in the cooperation probability between the two reputation dynamics
is relatively large when sB is −− or +−. This is because players with the B reputation, albeit
occupying a small fraction, can make other players with the G reputation to transit to the B
reputation in one step under these social norms.
Under image scoring, the stable population as a function of b/c and the error probabilities
under the assumption ǫi = ǫa is shown in Fig. 4(B). Figure 4(B) is similar to the results for
the gradual reputation dynamics shown in Fig. 4(A). As a slight difference between Figs. 4(A)
and 4(B), less cooperative populations (e.g., a homogeneous population of gDisc as compared
to a heterogeneous population of gDisc and AllC) can be stable in the downward saltatory
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reputation dynamics than in the gradual reputation dynamics for the same values of b/c and
the error probability. This is intuitively because the downward saltatory reputation dynamics
yields worse reputations than the gradual reputation dynamics.
We find that Self mutants cannot invade any of the stable populations shown in Fig. 3(A).
4.2.2 Upward Saltation
We next identified the stable populations under the saltatory reputation dynamics (Fig. 2(B))
given by βd = 0, and βu = 0.5. This dynamics implies that a B reputation of a donor jumps up
to a G reputation in one step with a probability βu = 0.5. We set ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 and identify
stable populations under each social norm. To select cooperative equilibria, we imposed the
same condition as that in the case of the gradual reputation dynamics, i.e., a cooperation
probability larger than 0.5 for some b/c < 20.
We find that the set of cooperative equilibria (without consideration of Self mutants) is
the same as that for the gradual reputation dynamics. The cooperation probabilities in stable
and cooperative populations are equal to 0.9416 for rDisc under standing–standing, 0.9401 for
rDisc under standing–shunning, 0.7605 for rDisc under shunning–standing, 0.9785 for gDisc
under scoring–standing, and 0.9783 for gDisc under scoring–shunning or image scoring. The
cooperation probability is preserved if we replace standing by judging. Because a B reputation
can turn into a G reputation in one step, the probability of cooperation is a little larger than in
the case of the gradual reputation dynamics. The difference is relatively large when sN = −−.
Under image scoring, the stable population as a function of b/c and ǫi (= ǫa) is shown in
Fig. 4(C). Figure 4(C) is quantitatively different from the results for the gradual reputation
dynamics shown in Fig. 4(A). More cooperative action rules (e.g., a heterogeneous population
of gDisc and AllC compared to a homogeneous population of gDisc) are stable in the upward
saltatory reputation dynamics than in the gradual reputation dynamics for the same values
of b/c and the error probability. This is intuitively because the upward saltatory reputation
dynamics yields better reputations than the gradual reputation dynamics.
We find that Self mutants cannot invade a homogeneous population of rDisc under each of
the eight social norms satisfying sG = +− and sN = ++, −+, −−. However, under social
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norms satisfying sG = sN = +−, with image scoring included, the nine populations are not
stable against invasion by Self mutants. The result that Self undermines cooperation is the
same as that for the gradual reputation dynamics (Fig. 4(A)).
5 Discussion
We analyzed a trinary reputation model of indirect reciprocity and identified cooperative Nash
equilibria composed of a single action rule or mixture of two action rules. Independent of details
of the reputation dynamics (i.e., gradual or saltatory), we found at a small error level (i.e.,
ǫi = ǫa = 0.02) that 12 homogeneous populations and five mixed populations are cooperative
and stable under different social norms (Fig. 3(A)). When the error probabilities are even
smaller, eight homogeneous populations and four mixed populations remain stable (Appendix
B). In particular, under image scoring, the heterogeneous population composed of gDisc and
CDC (a variant of rDisc) is stable in the error-free limit (Fig. 4(A); see Fig. 1(B) for the
definition of gDisc, CDC, and rDisc).
The results derived from the trinary reputation model and those derived from the binary
reputation model (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a) are similar in some aspects. For example, the
standing–standing social norm (i.e., sG = +−, sN = sB = ++) in the trinary model coincides
with the standing social norm in the binary model (Fig. 1(D)) if we merge the N and B repu-
tations in the trinary model. Therefore, the result that standing–standing enables cooperation
is not surprising. Similarly, scoring–judging (i.e., sG = sN = +−, sB = −+), for example, is
almost equivalent to judging in the binary model if we merge G and N reputations in the trinary
model. However, the results for the trinary and binary models are fundamentally different in
the following two aspects.
First, shunning (see Fig. 1(D) in the case of the binary reputation model) is more supportive
of cooperation in the trinary than binary model. In the binary model, shunning results in
a cooperation probability of ≈ 1/2 in the error-free limit unless a cooperation prone initial
condition and a finite number of rounds are combined (Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007) or reputations
of players are only partially visible to others (Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). In the trinary
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model, shunning–standing and shunning–judging stabilize full cooperation in the error-free
limit (Appendix B). Under these social norms, a donor meeting a recipient with an N reputation
receives − irrespective of the action, which is common to the behavior of the binary model. In
the trinary model, however, even if a donor obtains a B reputation, the donor easily receives +
either by cooperating with a G recipient or justifiably defecting against a B recipient. Owing
to the contribution of the justified defection, a donor gains + more often than − on average. If
players with the G reputation increase in number owing to this mechanism, players more likely
receive + than −. This positive feedback sustains cooperation under shunning–related social
norms in the trinary model.
Second, and the more important, image scoring is capable of supporting cooperation in our
model. Even if we consider Self mutants, which avoid a B reputation and are as selfish as
possible, image scoring supports cooperation if the probability that a G reputation transits
to a B reputation in one step is positive. In previous literature, the Self strategy is recog-
nized as a strong competitor that spoils cooperation in the indirect reciprocity game with more
than two possible reputation values (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). Our conclusion that image
scoring can support cooperation is consistent with the results derived from behavioral exper-
iments (Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2001; Seinen & Schram, 2006) and those
derived from numerical simulations (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b; Diekmann & Przepiorka, 2005)
but opposite to those derived from the binary reputation model (Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003;
Ohtsuki, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2007). We reached this conclusion by
simply introducing a third reputation to the standard binary model of indirect reciprocity. The
cooperation under image scoring in our model does not require forced cooperation in the first
round (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998a), partial cooperation of defective players (Fishman, 2003), bi-
nomially or Poisson distributed number of rounds (Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Brandt & Sigmund, 2006),
growth of social networks used for transmission of reputation (Brandt & Sigmund, 2005), or a
small probability with which the donor’s reputation is revealed to other players (Uchida, 2010).
In our model, cooperation under image scoring occurs for the following intuitive reason.
Although the composition of the stable population depends on the benefit-to-cost ratio and
the error probabilities, the main action rule present in the stable population is gDisc, which
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cooperates with G and N recipients and defects against B recipients. In the equilibrium, most
gDisc resident players possess the G reputation. If some AllD mutants are present, a B player
in the population is likely to be AllD and not gDisc. With the trinary reputation, gDisc players
justifiably defect (i.e., D against a B recipient) but do not selfishly defect (i.e., D against a
G or N recipient). A donor that has justifiably defected would receive an N reputation but
not a B reputation because few recipients have the B reputation in the population. Therefore,
gDisc players would not obtain the B reputation. gDisc players that happen to obtain the N
reputation, when selected as donor, likely meet a recipient with a G reputation such that they
regain the G reputation. In contrast, AllD players would obtain the B reputation such that
they are not helped by others. This contrasts with the case of the binary reputation model, in
which a discriminating donor that defects against whatever recipient immediately receives the
worst reputation (i.e., B) and then is defected by others.
The presence of downward saltation (i.e., transition from the G reputation to B reputation
in one step) is a key to make a cooperative population stable against invasion by Self mutants.
To explain this point intuitively, let us consider a homogeneous population of gDisc and assume
that the implementation and assessment errors are absent. If downward saltation is absent in
the reputation dynamics, Self mutants flip between G and N reputations by alternatingly coop-
erating and defecting. By doing so, the Self mutants can elicit cooperation from gDisc residents
and cooperate with probability ≈ 1/2. Because gDisc residents cooperate with probability ≈ 1,
the gDisc population is invaded by Self mutants. However, if downward saltation can occur
in the reputation dynamics, a nonnegligible fraction of Self mutants possess the B reputation
because they defect when they have the G reputation. In contrast, gDisc players maintain the
G reputation because they cooperate even if they have the G reputation. Therefore, in the
presence of downward saltation, Self mutants cannot invade the population of gDisc residents.
The mechanism of cooperation under image scoring in our model is similar to that under the
so-called tolerant scoring proposed by Berger (Berger, 2011). The population of tolerant dis-
criminator, which defects against a recipient if the recipient has defected in the last two rounds
and cooperates otherwise, is stable. Berger’s results and ours are different in the following
aspects. First, Berger assumed three action rules, i.e., tolerant discriminator, which is similar
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to gDisc, AllC, and AllD and investigated the behavior of the model under tolerant scoring.
We carried out an exhaustive search of the space of the action rule and social norms to find the
viability of image scoring. Second, in our model, cooperation is stable even if the reputation
moves only one step in a round, if the Self mutants are not considered. It should be noted that
Berger did not consider the Self mutants. Third, cooperation is realized by a homogeneous
population of one type of players in the Berger’s model. In our model, cooperation is realized
by mixture of two types of discriminative players (i.e., gDisc and CDC).
The present study has following limitations. First, we assumed that all the players in the
population use the same social norm. This oversimplification excludes a possible situation
in which different norms compete in a population (e.g., (Pacheco et al., 2006; Uchida, 2010)).
Second, we only analyzed the stability of populations composed of up to two action rules for
simplicity. Third, we analyzed local stability of the equilibria and disregarded dynamics. Even
when a cooperative equilibrium is locally stable, it may in fact attract a tiny fraction of initial
conditions. Fourth, we assumed that the reputation sharing is public. In other words, the
information about the donor’s new reputation immediately spreads from the observer to the
entire population. In a large population, such immediate spreading is impossible, and one has
to assume, for example, that only a fraction of players gains the information about a donor in
one game (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998b; Brandt & Sigmund, 2004; Uchida, 2010).
Appendix A: Distribution of the Reputation for the Salta-
tory Reputation Dynamics
Under the saltatory reputation dynamics (Fig. 2(B)), we obtain


p∗G = p
∗
GΦ
∗ + p∗NΦ
∗ + p∗BβuΦ
∗,
p∗N = p
∗
G(1− βd)(1− Φ
∗) + p∗B(1− βu)Φ
∗,
p∗B = p
∗
Gβd(1− Φ
∗) + p∗N(1− Φ
∗) + p∗B(1− Φ
∗).
(15)
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Equation (15) and the normalization p∗G + p
∗
N + p
∗
B = 1 lead to

p∗G
p∗N
p∗B

 = 1
Z


(1− βu)Φ
∗2 + βuΦ
∗
(1− βdβu)Φ
∗(1− Φ∗)
(1− βd)(1− Φ
∗)2 + βd(1− Φ
∗)

 , (16)
where Z = 1− (1− βd)(1− βu)Φ
∗(1− Φ∗).
Appendix B: Justification of the Criterion of Equilibrium
Selection
We defined cooperative equilibrium as stable population in which the probability of cooper-
ation is larger than 0.5 for some b/c such that b/c < 20. To justify this criterion, we carry
out additional numerical simulations with various error probabilities satisfying ǫi = ǫa. The
probability of cooperation in each stable homogeneous population is shown for various error
probability values in Fig. 5. Figure 5 shows that, under 13 out of the 22 stable action–norm
pairs, the probability of cooperation seems to converge to unity in the error-free limit. It should
be noted that we identified 12, not 13, cooperative homogeneous populations in the main text.
One of the 13 action–norm pairs is excluded because it is stable only for large b/c values (i.e.,
b/c > 52.63) at ǫ
i
= ǫ
a
= 0.02 (Table 1). The probability of cooperation is larger than 0.5
for some b/c for five out of the nine stable heterogeneous populations composed of two action
rules. For all the five heterogeneous populations, the probability of cooperation is larger than
0.5 for a b/c value smaller than 20 at ǫi = ǫa = 0.02.
In the homogeneous populations, under eight out of the 13 social norms for which the prob-
ability of cooperation seems to converge to unity in the error-free limit, i.e., standing–standing,
standing–judging, standing–shunning, judging–standing, judging–judging, judging–shunning,
shunning–standing, and shunning–judging, the range of b/c in which the corresponding ac-
tion rule is stable tends to b/c > 1 as the error probabilities become small. For example,
under standing–standing, standing–judging, judging–standing, and judging–judging, the ho-
mogeneous population of rDisc is stable in the range b/c > 1.00006 when ǫi = ǫa = 0.0025;
the corresponding range is b/c > 1.004 when ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 (Table 1). Under the other five
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social norms, i.e., standing–scoring, scoring–standing, scoring–judging, scoring–shunning, and
scoring–scoring, stable cooperation requires a large value of b/c when the error probabilities
are small. For example, under standing–scoring, the homogeneous population of CDC is stable
in the range b/c > 402.1 when ǫi = ǫa = 0.0025; the corresponding range is b/c > 52.63 when
ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 (Table 1). Under image scoring, the homogeneous population of gDisc is stable
in the range b/c > 66.51 when ǫi = ǫa = 0.0025; the corresponding range is 8.230 < b/c < 12.53
when ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 (Table 1, Fig. 4(A)).
In the heterogeneous populations, four out of five equilibria, i.e., mixture of gDisc and rDisc
under scoring–standing, mixture of gDisc and rDisc under scoring–judging, mixture of gDisc
and rDisc under scoring–shunning, and mixture of gDisc and CDC under image scoring, realize
a large probability of cooperation in a wide range of b/c when ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 (Figs. 3(B) and
3(C)) and also do so when the error probabilities are smaller. For example, the heterogeneous
population composed of gDisc and CDC is stable under image scoring in the range 1.994 <
b/c < 66.51 when ǫi = ǫa = 0.0025; the corresponding range is 1.941 < b/c < 8.230 when
ǫi = ǫa = 0.02 (Fig. 4(A)).
Appendix C: Fraction of Two Action Rules in the Error-
free Limit
We consider a social norm given by sG = sN = +− and sB = ++, −+, or −−. In the limit
ǫi, ǫa → 0, the fraction of gDisc, denoted by qgDisc, and that of rDisc converge to 1 − c/b and
c/b, respectively, for the following reason. In the equilibrium, few players possess the N or B
reputation. The behavior of rDisc players and that of gDisc players differ only toward recipients
with reputation N. An rDisc donor with a G reputation defects against a recipient with an
N reputation, receives −, and transits to the N reputation. If this rDisc player is selected as
recipient, an rDisc donor defects and a gDisc donor cooperates. If selected as donor, this rDisc
player would cooperate because most recipients have the G reputation, receive +, and transit
to G. Because the rDisc player with an N reputation is selected as recipient once on average
before selected as donor, the expected payoff to the rDisc donor during this period is equal to
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qgDiscb on average. During the same period, a gDisc donor with a G reputation cooperates with
a recipient with an N reputation, pays c, receives +, keeps a G reputation, and gains benefit
b when selected as recipient. By equating the payoffs to rDisc and gDisc players, we obtain
qgDiscb = −c + b, which leads to qgDisc = 1− c/b.
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Figure 1: Rule of the donation game with trinary reputations. (A) Illustration of the inter-
action in a single game. (B) Eight action rules. (C) Representative social norms. The rows
represent the donor’s actions (i.e., C and D), the columns represent the recipient’s reputations
(G, N, and B), and + and − represent the assessments that observer assigns to the donor. (D)
Representative social norms in the binary reputation model.
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Figure 2: Two types of reputation dynamics. (A) Gradual reputation dynamics. (B) Saltatory
reputation dynamics. Φ represents the probability that the donor receives +.
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Figure 3: Results for the gradual reputation dynamics. We set ǫi = ǫa = 0.02. (A) Cooperative
and stable action rules under different social norms. All the shown social norms own sG = +−.
(B) Average cooperation probability and the fraction of gDisc players under scoring–standing
(i.e., sG = sN = +− and sB = ++). It should be noted that the fraction of gDisc and that
of rDisc sum to unity. (C) Average cooperation probability and the fraction of gDisc players
under scoring–scoring (also called image scoring; sG = sN = sB = +−). The fraction of gDisc
and that of CDC or AllC sum to unity.
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Figure 4: Parameter regions in which one of the three populations is stable under image
scoring. We set the error probability ǫi = ǫa. (A) Gradual reputation dynamics, i.e., (βd, βu) =
(0, 0). (B) Saltatory reputation dynamics with downward saltation, i.e., (βd, βu) = (0.5, 0). (C)
Saltatory reputation dynamics with upward saltation, i.e., (βd, βu) = (0, 0.5). The cooperative
population is stable against invasion by Self mutants in the parameter region above the green
line in (B). Self invades the cooperative population in all the parameter regions in (A) and (C).
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Figure 5: Relationships between the probability of cooperation and the error probability for
the 22 stable homogeneous populations. We assume the gradual reputation dynamics and set
ǫi = ǫa. An asterisk represents either + or −.
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Table 1: Stable action–norm pairs. We also show the range of b/c in which action rule σ
is stable, probability of C, and mean + assessment (i.e., Φ∗) under the gradual reputation
dynamics. An asterisk represents either + or −. We set ǫi = ǫa = 0.02.
σ sG sN sB range of b/c %C Φ
∗
CCD +− +−
∗+ 8.480 < b/c 0.9784 0.9800
−− 8.108 < b/c
0.9783 0.9783
+− 8.230 < b/c < 12.53
CDC +− ++ +− 52.63 < b/c 0.9424 0.9808
CDD +−
∗+ ∗+ 1.004 < b/c 0.9409 0.9808
∗+ −− 1.004 < b/c 0.9392 0.9792
−− ∗+ 1.018 < b/c 0.6571 0.7445
DCD
∗−
+−
∗+ 3.716 < b/c 0.3191 0.5688
+− ∗− 1.137 < b/c < 1.296
0.1833 0.1833−− −− 1.120 < b/c
−− +− 1.120 < b/c < 11.66
CDD +− −− −− 25.54 < b/c 0.0004 0.0004
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